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Abstract. Oil was found for the first time in commercial quantity in Nigeria in 1956 with the 
outbreak of the Six Days’ War it became of paramount importance for the West. It could not 
also be ignored that Arab producers were acquiring such a big surplus of financial reserves 
that they were already able to stop production for a considerable span of time. The Nigerian 
civil war ended in January 1970 and oil represented a valid alternative to traditional sources 
of supply. The West African country started to give priority to strengthening ties with fellow-
Africans and cooperating with other Third World countries. The American policy towards 
black Africa radically changed after the military coup overthrowing the dictatorship in 
Portugal in 1974. Soviet, Cuban and Chinese aid to national liberation movements of Southern 
Africa persuaded Kissinger that it had become necessary to contain communist influence in 
order to avoid a large scale war. Within this context, Nigeria was by far the most important 
country in black Africa for the United States, being the world’s fifth largest oil exporter and 
with an estimated forty trillion cubic feet of natural gas. From a poor country located within 
the British traditional sphere of influence, Nigeria had become a privileged trading partner, 
thus leading to a commercial rivalry among Western allies.  
 
Keywords. Oil; Nigeria; Atlantic Powers; United States.  
 
Introduction 
 
«Nigeria’s size […], economic potential, active diplomacy, and often 
acknowledged role as spokesman for the interests of Black Africa make it a 
major center of influence on the Continent and the developing world. 
Friendly ties with Lagos give us access to a significant locus of power […]. 
US private investment in Nigeria has grown to some $ 800 million. Most of 
it is and will probably continue to be in oil […]. We have a large interest in 
protecting the stake of US investors […]. Nigeria is second only to South 
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Africa as a market for US products on the Continent».1 Through words like 
these it is easy to realise how pivotal the country at issue was for the United 
States in the 1970s. American interests intersected with African issues 
along three main points: access to economic resources and investment 
opportunities, relations between developed and less developed countries 
within the United Nations, and internalisation of African conflicts.2 
According to this scheme, Nigeria’s military strength of 250,000 men and 
the ability to act as back-up source of petroleum supplier for Europe were 
turning Lagos into one of the main centres of power in the Third World.3 
As an evidence of this, two thirds of the Nigerian oil production were in 
British hands, thanks to the substantial Shell and British Petroleum 
investments in the country, which had set up the Shell-British Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. Moreover, the two majors had a 
further interest by virtue of the fact that they possessed a twenty percent 
share in the Nigerian refining industry. In a few words, the British stake in 
that country was so important that it could be affected by several factors. 
For example, in case of an arms sale on a large scale to South Africa, the 
Federal Government could decide to take over the British share in the oil 
industry. Such a raw material was particularly important also for the supply 
of the British home market, so that in 1971 8 percent of the United 
Kingdom’s imports had come from Nigeria.4
                                                 
1African Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation Paper (PARA): Nigeria, 1972, Approved by 
the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa, AF/W 77D84, 1788 POL 1-B PARA, 
Confidential/Noforn, in National Archives and Records Administration (thereafter NARA), 
College Park, MD, Record Group 59 (thereafter RG 59), A1 5712, General Records of the 
Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Office of West African Affairs, Records 
Relating to Nigeria, 1967-1975, Box 7, Lot 77D84, POL 2-A 1973, Political Relations: 
US/Nigeria.      
 Due to growing petroleum 
reserves, moreover, the country had become financially solvent and the 
central military government enjoyed stronger and stronger power over the 
States of the federation, thus gaining American respect as an emerging 
2 See J.S. WHITAKER, Introduction: Africa and U.S. Interests, in J.S. WHITAKER, ed., Africa 
and the United States: Vital Interests, New York, NY, New York University Press, 1978, p. 6. 
3 See Airgram A-22 from the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria: Nigeria - Policy 
Planning Paper, Approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa, June 21, 1971, 
Secret, Limdis, Noforn, in NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 1970-73, POL 1 Nigeria-U.S. 
4 See J.R. Bretherton to N. Power: Oil in Nigeria, Aug 17, 1972, 56/419/8, Confidential, in 
The National Archives (thereafter TNA), Kew, London, POWE 63/830, History of the Oil 
Industry in Nigeria, 1972-1974, PET 56/419/8.   
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reality on the whole African scene.5 Since the end of the civil war in 1970, 
the Central Intelligence Agency had monitored the West African country to 
focus its potentiality and possible role in a Cold War scenario. Although 
still a poor nation in terms of per capita income and living standards, and 
despite widespread corruption and the dependence on an autocratic 
government, Nigeria was regarded to have the best prospects for 
development of any black African State. Its more than respectable oil fields, 
in fact, were closer to Western European markets than those of the Persian 
Gulf, and had also a much lower quantity of sulphur, which made Nigerian 
raw material easier and less polluting to refine. Apart from that, the West 
African State’s economy did not rely on a single source of income, for the 
agricultural sector was able to supply basic food requirements and 
guarantee exports in quite a large variety. Finally, the large size of the 
population, around fifty-five million in those times, encouraged 
investments and could potentially lead to the setting up of a good market 
for Western goods.6
    The key to analyse the political and economic fortunes of the West 
African country is to be found in the kind of economy the British had 
developed during the colonial rule and in the ethnic puzzle shaping Nigeria. 
The two protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria had been unified in 
1914 and the reason for this amalgamation was mainly economic. The 
Northern protectorate, in fact, had not managed to become self-financing, 
as taxation had not produced enough revenue to cover administrative needs 
and the level of trade had not made the region profitable. Hence, the 
Northern protectorate relied on annual subsidies from the South and the 
British government as well.
    
7
                                                 
5 See Memorandum of Conversation: US-French Bilateral Exchange on Africa: IV – Non-
Francophone Africa, May 2, 1972, Confidential, in NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 1970-73, 
ORG 7 AF, POL FR-US. 
 The new approach to economic development 
had different goals. First of all, the Administration had to expand Nigerian 
commerce through the exportation of raw materials and the importation of 
European goods. Moreover, Nigeria was to be brought into a cash economy 
based on the UK sterling pound. Over time, the country became dependent 
6 See National Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Postwar Nigeria, Nov 2, 1970, NIE 64.2-
70, Secret, Controlled Dissem, doc. 201, in E.C. KEEFER (Gen. Ed.), J. HILTS - D.C. 
HUMPHREY, eds., Foreign Relations of the United States (thereafter FRUS), 1969-1976, Vol. 
E-5, Part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharian Africa, 1969-1972, in http://history.state.gov.    
7 See M. CROWDER, The Story of Nigeria, London, Faber and Faber, 1971, p. 240.  
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on an export economy ruled by European firms with which indigenous 
enterprises could not compete and which carried out business mainly with a 
view towards European profitability. In order to implement all this, the 
British built infrastructures such as roads, railways and harbours, beside 
expanding navigable waterways. As regarded local population, the 
Nigerians had many reasons to involve themselves in the colonial economy, 
since several products, such as cotton and palm oil, had already been 
cultivated for domestic use for centuries. The English simply encouraged 
farmers to produce more and sell surplus for export.8 However, Western-
educated Nigerians had also good reasons to reproach colonial rule, which 
was founded on the ideology of the Dual Mandate, on grounds of which the 
government of a colony had to benefit both the Empire and the colony 
itself. In spite of this, Africans were always regarded as inferior to 
Europeans and needed gradual improvement under British supervision. 
According to the first British Governor of unified Nigeria, Frederick 
Lugard, the ideal Nigerian was one that had received enough education to 
be useful to the colonial system filling low-level bureaucratic positions, but 
not enough to think himself able to do a white man’s job.9 Apart from that, 
there were over 250 ethnic groups living within the territory. Among those, 
there were three larger ethno-linguistic groups, that is Hausa-Fulani in the 
North, Yoruba in the West, and Igbo in the East. The Northern population 
was largely Muslim, cutting across Hausa-Fulani and some Yoruba areas, 
while the South was mainly Christian, especially in Igbo and partially 
Yoruba areas.10 The North had developed very differently from the rest of 
the country, for it lagged far behind the South in terms of European-
educated population. Hence, Northerners feared that incorporation into an 
independent and unitary Nigerian State moulded according to European 
standards would cause their cultural and political submission to the South.11
                                                 
8 See T. FALOLA – M.M. HEATON, A History of Nigeria, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2008, pp. 119-122.  
 
The 1951 constitution, promoted by Governor John Macpherson, changed 
these cultural distinction into really political battle-lines. The new 
document provided a Council of Ministers, made up of twelve Nigerian 
ministers, four from each region, and six official members. The central 
9 See ibid., p. 129.  
10 See S.A. KHAN, Nigeria: The Political Economy of Oil, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1994, p. 7.  
11 See FALOLA – HEATON, A History of Nigeria, p. 150. 
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legislature became a House of Representatives whose members came half 
from the North, a quarter from Southwest and Southeast. From that time 
onwards, political realities in the West and the East began to press the 
colonial government to extend full self-governance to regional assemblies, 
while the North opposed this plan, stating that it was not ready for self-
government yet. The real question at issue was centralisation of 
government, which was debated at the two constitutional conferences of 
London and Lagos in 1953 and 1954. The agreements reached were 
incorporated into the Constitution of 1954, establishing Nigeria as a 
federation of three regions, Northern, Western, and Eastern, while Lagos 
became a Federal Territory straightly administered by the central 
government. Each region had the option to enjoy full internal self-
government, without becoming independent, and Federation as a whole had 
to remain under British colonial authority. By 1959 all regions had opted 
for self-government and in 1957 Alhaji Tafawa Balewa had become the 
first Prime Minister of Nigeria. At the time, he was the Vice President and 
one of the European-educated founders of the National People’s Congress, 
a conservative party of the North which had fought against Southern 
domination. However, he did not come from the Hausa ethnic group that 
formed the majority of the Northern population and neither was a member 
of the Fulani aristocracy. Therefore, he was able to rally all main political 
parties into a national government. A final election was held in 1959 to 
determine Nigeria’s first independent government, giving the NPC the 
largest number of seats, while a majority government was formed through a 
coalition on the NPC and the National Council of Nigeria and the 
Cameroons (NCNC), which had been founded in 1944 by the Igbo Nnamdi 
Azikiwe, with its greatest support in the South and centre of gravity in 
Lagos. Unlike the NPC, the NCNC claimed a pan-Nigerian identity and 
sought self-government for the whole of Nigeria as a single entity. The 
Yoruba-dominated Action Group became the opposition party. Balewa kept 
his position of Premier and Azikiwe took the largely ceremonial title of first 
indigenous Governor General. Full independence within the 
Commonwealth of Nations, with Queen Elizabeth II as formal Head of 
State, was proclaimed on October 1, 1960, and three years later Nigeria 
became a Federal Republic. Despite nationalist euphoria, the country was 
neither economically, nor politically united. Regionalism and ethnicity 
obstructed the development of a national identity, while hundreds of 
minority ethnic groups prevented the larger ones from controlling regions. 
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Moreover, the country was always dependent on an economy based on the 
export of agricultural products and raw materials, whose control was in the 
hands of European firms.12
 
   
1. Evolution of the Oil Industry in Nigeria 
 
The first attempts to develop an oil industry in Nigeria can be dated back to 
1908, when a German company, the Nigerian Bitumen Company, started to 
explore along the whole coast for bitumen. However, with the German 
defeat in the first world war and the subsequent loss of the colonies in 
Africa, the German colonial authorities were expelled from those territories 
and their commercial enterprises were replaced by British and French 
ones.13 With the unification of Nigeria and the relative setting up of the 
British protectorate, the oil industry was initially made a British monopoly. 
Chapter 130 of the laws of Nigeria of 1914 stated that the power to grant 
licenses and leases for mineral oils should be exercised only in favour of a 
British company or subject.14
                                                 
12 Although the American share of Nigerian trade was rather low during the colonial era, its 
strategic value was quite important both for the United States and Nigeria, whose economy 
started to be globalised through the export of Nigerian cotton, the import of American cotton 
seeds into Nigerian agriculture, and the use of Ford vehicles for urban transport. See A. 
OLUKOJU, Economic Relations between Nigeria and the United States in the Era of British 
Colonial Rule, ca. 1900-1950, in A. JALLOH – T. FALOLA, eds., The United States and West 
Africa: Interactions and Relations, Rochester, NY, University of Rochester Press, 2008, p. 
106.           
 No other attempt was made to prospect for 
oil, due to the recession following the end of the war and the slump 
following the 1929 crisis. Initial survey for petroleum began in 1937, when 
the Shell D’Arcy Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, formed 
jointly by Shell and Anglo-Iranian, was given the right for exploration 
throughout the country. Later, when the company took out oil prospecting 
licenses, the concession was reduced to 40,000 square miles. Operations 
had to be suspended at the outbreak of the second world war and were 
resumed in 1946, beginning test drillings five years later. Oil was found for 
the first time in commercial quantity in 1956 (in the meantime the Shell 
D’Arcy Petroleum Development Company had changed its name into Shell 
13 See J.K. ONOH, The Nigerian Oil Economy, London-Canberra-New York, Croom Helm – 
St. Martin’s Press, 1983, p. 42.  
14 See A.A. IKEIN, The Impact of Oil on a Developing Country: The Case of Nigeria, New 
York, NY, Praeger, 1990, p. 2.  
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BP) at Olobiri in the riverine area of the country, soon followed by another 
well at Afam in the same area. Due to these discoveries, Shell BP moved its 
headquarters to Port Harcourt, a sea port in the South East. Besides, in that 
town there were the infrastructures required for the oil industry and in 
February 1958 the first Nigerian crude oil was pumped into a vessel and 
exported. Another tanker terminal was built in Bonny, further East from 
Port Harcourt, with a total storage capacity of 300,000 barrels of crude 
oil.15 In the meantime, Shell BP had started to relinquish acreage, therefore 
allowing other companies to take them up, thus breaking the British 
monopoly and drawing a map of competing interests on the Nigerian 
territory.16 During this process, offshore licences were also granted to four 
companies, one of which was Shell BP. The others were Socony Mobil, 
which sank its first exploration well in 1959, Tennessee Nigeria in 1962, 
Amoseas and Gulf in 1963, Safrap and Agip in 1964. Gulf was the first to 
strike oil and began production in 1965, but Shell BP kept the dominance 
resulting from its pioneering investigation of a geologically unexplored 
territory. In fact, by the same year it had already discovered about fifty oil 
fields in Nigeria, most of which were small or medium size by Middle East 
standards and even the largest Nigerian fields were much smaller than the 
biggest ones in the Middle Eastern area.17
     In the concession era, production levels and prices were practically 
determined by oil companies, while the government’s interests were limited 
to royalty collection. The dominance of foreign companies was also 
evidenced in the legislation providing significant incentives to exploration 
and production, sometimes at the expense of national interests. As regarded 
fiscal matters, till the discovery of commercial oil in good quantity royalties 
from minerals had belonged only to the region of origin, while the oil 
findings coincided with the need to review the revenue allocation scheme. 
For this reason, the colonial government set up a commission 
 
                                                 
15 See ONOH, The Nigerian Oil Economy, pp. 43-44. 
16 In 1959 the United States had resorted to a system of import quotas, which spurred 
producing areas like Nigeria, Libya and Algeria to add productive capacity and lower prices. 
Therefore, output in these countries came largely at the expense of traditional producers like 
Middle Eastern States and Venezuela. See B.H. WALL, Growth in a Changing Environment: A 
History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) 1950-1972 and Exxon Corporation 1972-
1975, New York, NY, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1988, p. 600.  
17 See J. BAMBERG, British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950-1975: The Challenge of 
Nationalism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 110-112.   
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recommending that the practice of returning mining rents and royalties to 
the region be discontinued, pooling them among the region of origin, other 
regions, and the federal government. On grounds of this, the discovery of 
oil marked the beginning of the dilution of the powers of regions in Nigeria 
to the benefit of the national government. With the South split in two 
regions, the by far larger North gained more and more political power.18 
Finally, the 1959 Petroleum Profits Tax Ordinance established the 
assessment of the companies’ taxable profits according to the companies’ 
realised prices to the volume of crude oil produced and exported. Once 
assessed the profit, this had to be shared between the companies and the 
government on a fifty-fifty basis,19 following the example of Venezuela and 
the Middle East.20 Despite the government’s ambition to be more involved 
in the oil industry, there was also awareness that legislation had to 
encourage further investments by foreign companies. Hence, the 1959 act 
was still regarded as a fairly favourable piece of legislation for the 
companies.21 In July 1962, an agreement was signed for the construction of 
an oil refinery, which was completed in Autumn 1965 at Port Harcourt, 
with the aim of reducing Nigeria’s importation of petroleum products. The 
facility was owned for 60 percent by the Federal Government, but the other 
40 percent was shared between Shell and BP, thus granting the Europeans 
another important interest to safeguard in the country. Initial crude capacity 
was of 32,000 b/d and pipelines were built to transport oil.22
                                                 
18 See C. UCHE, Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War, in «Journal of African 
History», IL, 1, March 2008, pp. 115-116.   
 Although the 
economy was being diversified, the decline of the agricultural sector and 
the relating labour force was not a good sign for the economic 
independence of the country. Moreover, bad weather conditions further 
affected harvest and transportation, so much so that the growth rate of 
agriculture in the 1960s was minus 0.5 percent, with the outcome that 
19 See KHAN, Nigeria, p. 16. 
20 The concession system provided producing governments a fixed tax, called royalty, for each 
ton of crude produced or exported. In the late forties, when prices had increased and the 
European economy had by then become almost totally dependent on Middle Eastern oil, such a 
meagre reward was no longer acceptable for producers. Hence, in 1948 Venezuela augmented 
taxes with the purpose to equally share profits with companies. See I. SEYMOUR, OPEC: 
Instrument of Change, New York, NY, St. Martin’s Press, 1981, p. 14. 
21 See L.H. SCHATZL, Petroleum in Nigeria, Ibadan, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 84.  
22 See ONOH, The Nigerian Oil Economy, p. 49. 
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increasing amounts of food had to be imported. Finally, the need to fund 
development projects pushed the government to facilitate foreign 
companies through tax breaks, protected tariffs and other incentives for 
investors. These measures and investments, despite augmenting 
productivity and diversifying the economy, actually perpetuated the 
dependence on foreign sources.23 As concerned oil, in 1964 Nigeria first 
attended an OPEC conference as official observer and three years later the 
Petroleum Profits Tax Amendment Decree was promulgated, allowing 
taxes and profits to be assessed on posted prices and royalties to be assessed 
as current operational expenditure, rather than being included in the State’s 
50 percent share of profits. This practically increased the tax revenues 
received by the government by an additional 50 percent of the value of 
royalties and encouraged OPEC producers to replace realised prices with 
posted prices as a basis for tax and profit assessment.24
 
                
2. Civil War and Anglo-American Interests 
 
According to Western analyses, black Africa in general was under threat of 
communist penetration, with Soviets and Chinese working on the 
ideological conversion of newly independent States to supplant Western 
influence. Although more damaging on a longer term, the Russian threat 
was seen as less worrying than the Chinese one at the moment.25
                                                 
23 See FALOLA – HEATON, A History of Nigeria, p. 164. 
 However, 
Beijing had certain advantages in the continent. As a former target for 
European and Russian imperialism, in fact, China could claim to have much 
in common with emerging nations of Africa, being itself an example of how 
a backward nation could grow economically without foreign aid. On the 
other hand, Chinese resources were still limited and Mao’s regime was not 
24 See Memorandum from Mr. R.P. Smith to Mr. R.M. Melbourne: Amendment of Nigerian 
Petroleum Profit Tax, Jan 16, 1967, Confidential, in NARA, RG 59, A1 5712, Box 2, Lot 
69D1, PET 1, General Policy. Plans, Petroleum, Jan-Jun 30, 1967, Nigeria; KHAN, Nigeria, 
pp. 16-17. 
25 Since many liberation movements and newly formed countries regarded the Soviet 
experience as a model of social progress and modernisation, Khrushchev had aimed at turning 
some African nations into Soviet strongholds in the continent. Nevertheless, according to a 
1964 report, the Soviets themselves did not have any knowledge of those countries and their 
aid had not gained what they expected. See V.M. ZUBOK, (A Failed Empire): The Soviet 
Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, Chapel Hill, NC, The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2007, pp. 247-248. 
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able in the long run to offer enough industrial help. Moreover, the 
contradiction between China’s support of existing regimes for practical 
reasons and the ideological and military training to rebel movements for 
revolutionary ends could not be accepted by established leaders. Overall 
speaking, African regimes were Western oriented, though the Chinese had 
gained some diplomatic success in their struggle to recognise Beijing as the 
true government of China and therefore as the proper occupant of the 
Chinese seat at the United Nations, but the Atlantic powers could not 
prevent communist rivals from continuing their activities in Africa, 
provided that parts of the continent were not brought within the communist 
orbit. Hence, the West had to deal also with autocratic governments, trying 
to distinguish between relatively progressive and basically reactionary 
regimes.26 As concerned the American posture, the Embassy in London 
thought that Africa by then occupied a key position in the world and that 
the danger of communist penetration could produce, if it got out of hand, a 
situation similar to that of Vietnam. However, Washington recognised the 
primary interests of former colonial powers in certain African countries and 
preferred playing a secondary role.27
    According to CIA analyses, the federal system was unable to reconcile 
the bitter antagonism among different tribal and regional grouping within 
the country.
   
28
                                                 
26 See FO Paper: The Implications of Sino-Soviet Penetration of Africa, Nov 1964, DO216/19, 
in S.R. ASHTON, gen. ed., British Documents on the End of Empire (thereafter BDEE), Series 
A, Vol. 5, S.R. ASHTON – Wm. ROGER LOUIS, eds., East of Suez and the Commonwealth 1964-
1971, Part III, Dependent Territories, Africa, Economics, Race, London, The Stationary 
Office, 2004, doc. 357, pp. 287-294. 
 The generally better educated Igbos of the East managed to 
fill better jobs in government and public places and dominated commercial 
life. However, as the central government’s powers increased, its domination 
by the conservative and Moslem North became more and more intolerable 
27 See “Anglo-American Talks on Africa”: Records of Opening and Final Meetings Held at 
the FO, 22-23 Mar 1965, DO 216/26, No. 34, ibid., doc. 363, pp. 312-319. 
28 During the December 1964 federal election campaign in Nigeria, a threat of secession came 
from the Eastern region, where large oil deposits had been discovered. See Memorandum from 
Samuel E. Belk of National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National 
Security Affairs (Bundy): The Situation in Nigeria, Dec 30, 1964, Official Use Only, in D.S. 
PATTERSON (gen. ed.) – N. DAVIS HOWLAND (ed.), FRUS 1964-1968, Vol. XXIV, Africa, 
Washington D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1999, doc. 358, p. 612. 
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to Southerners.29 Narrow regional interests and continued tensions between 
North and East clearly put the unity of the country in jeopardy and this was 
something the Americans were worried about, though a breakdown of the 
Republic was regarded as out of question for a few more years.30
                                                 
29 See Special Memorandum: Nigeria and the Congo – Implications for Black Africa, Nov 6, 
1967, No. 9-67, Secret, in www.foia.cia.gov.  
 Instead, 
the 1965 Western regional elections turned out to be the end of the First 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. Both competing parties, Action Group and the 
Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), the latter being aligned with 
the Northern Region, claimed victory and tried to take over the Regional 
House of Assembly, swearing in its own leader as Premier. The supposed 
victory of the NNDP was greeted with a complete breakdown of law and 
order, while the whole political system of the federation was in turmoil. 
This paved the way to the military coup of January 15, 1966, whose leaders 
claimed that their aim was the end of corruption and tribalism. The military 
arrested all regional premiers and killed Federal Prime Minister Balewa and 
the Prime Ministers of the Northern and Western regions. Major-General 
John Aguiyi-Ironsi, from the Igbo ethnicity, became President of the 
Federation, outlawing all political parties and placing military governors in 
all regions. Among them, Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu 
Ojukwu was appointed governor of the oil rich Eastern Region. To many 
Southerners, the end of the civilian regime and the involvement of a lot of 
Igbos in the new military junta was a sort of liberation from the domination 
of the North. Instead, many Northerners were alarmed that the military era 
would lead to an Igbo domination, especially when on May 24, 1966, the 
government issued Unification Decree No. 34, through which the federation 
was abolished and replaced with a unitary system. To Northerners this 
meant nothing but Igbo domination, facing the prospect of being occupied 
and ruled by Southern military and civil servants and lacking the safeguard 
of being involved in the government according to ethnic group divisions. 
Strong reaction was inevitable and on July 29 a group of Northern officers 
carried out a countercoup, killing General Ironsi and selecting Colonel 
Yakubu Gowon as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and new 
Head of State. Gowon immediately repealed Decree No. 34 and stated that 
Nigeria was committed to unity within a federal structure respecting 
30 See National Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Nigeria, Aug 26, 1965, NIE 64.2-65, 
Secret, Controlled Dissem, in FRUS 1964-1968, Vol. XXIV, doc. 360, pp. 613-614. 
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regional differences.31 Although from the North, he was a Christian of the 
Nga minority group. He aimed at holding the country together through 
constitutional changes to the federal system, including a sub-division of the 
three main provinces into smaller units. In spite of this, he did not manage 
to stop violence and in a few weeks’ time there was a further outbreak of 
riots in the North, with massacres of Igbos and tens of thousands of 
refugees. Therefore, independence of the Eastern region seemed to offer the 
Igbos the only way to find security.32
    The fact that the lands claimed by the Eastern region contained about two 
thirds of the country’soil reserves implied that foreign policy had become 
vital. On the verge of the civil war, Nigerian output had risen to 516,000 
barrels a day, making the country the tenth largest exporter in the world. 
Therefore, revenues were vital to the economy and oil exports accounted 
for one-third of the nation’s total export earnings.
  
33 Moreover, relations 
with other nations were determined by calculations of who was willing to 
send weapons to Lagos or to the Eastern region, later called Biafra. Past 
friendship and sympathies counted for little, since oil interests influenced 
the Western powers, which aimed at keeping the country united. The 
original intention of the countercoup leaders, in fact, was to seize power 
and then announce the secession of the North. The project was not 
implemented because Gowon was dissuaded by the British and American 
ambassadors, who stated that the North could not survive without the South 
and threatened that any further foreign assistance would come only if the 
federation did not dissolve.34 By hearing these words, Gowon assumed that 
both Anglo-Saxon powers strongly wanted Nigeria to remain intact and 
they would supply Lagos with military aid in case of secession.35
                                                 
31 See FALOLA – HEATON, A History of Nigeria, pp. 172-174. 
 
Consequently, the British Government asked its High Commissioner in 
Nigeria to serve in a consultative capacity to the Nigerian Government 
during the discussions on the future political organisation of the country. In 
32 See J.W. YOUNG, The Labour Governments 1964-1970, Vol. 2, International Policy, 
Manchester-New York, NY, Manchester University Press, 2003, p. 196. 
33 See O. ABENGURIN, Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966-1999, Westport, 
CT, Praeger, 2003, p. 49. 
34 See J.J. STREMLAU, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970, 
Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 36.  
35 See R.B. SHEPARD, Nigeria, Africa, and the United States: From Kennedy to Reagan, 
Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1991, p. 37.  
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a secret memorandum signed in late September 1966, the Commonwealth 
Office gave the High Commissioner the following instructions: a) Nigeria 
was one of the most powerful African States and had always been 
favourable to the United Kingdom and the West in general. Any division of 
the country into smaller entities could open some of them to outside and 
hostile influence; b) there were plenty of British commercial interests in 
Nigeria, with also a resident population of 17,000. In particular, oil 
installations and facilities under construction in the Niger Delta area were 
being developed with British capital and management and the previous year 
exports worth seventy-eight million pounds had been shipped from there. 
The obvious conclusion of the report was that separation of Nigeria into 
States of doubtful economic viability would jeopardise UK commercial 
interests.36 As already said, Shell-BP was by far the main oil producer in 
the West African country, but Britain was also the major recipient of 
Nigerian oil, as around 40 percent of the total Nigerian production ended up 
there. Besides, the position of Shell-PB was further complicated by the fact 
that oil production was split between the Eastern and the Mid-Western 
region, with two-thirds of its operations being concentrated in the East.37 
As regarded the Americans, they were also interested in the integrity of 
Nigeria, but if unity was no longer possible despite U.S. and U.K. efforts, 
Washington had to protect its own interests and maintain its presence in all 
regions to prevent someone else from filling the vacuum.38
    In order to further undermine the powers of the Igbos in the East, on the 
eve of the civil war the military junta changed the federal structure of the 
country from four regions into twelve States. Two of these, the Rivers and 
South-East States, catered for minorities in the Delta area which had 
previously formed the Eastern region, declared independent on May 30, 
1967, with the name of Biafra. Most minorities felt oppressed by the Igbo 
domination and supported the federal government during the war. Not only 
the creation of new States detached non Igbo ethnicities from the Biafran 
cause, but also put the bulk of the Niger Delta petroleum resources outside 
       
                                                 
36 See Briefing Notes for the Prime Minister for His Meeting with the Nigerian High 
Commissioner, Brigadier Ogundipe and Mr. V.A. Adegoroye, Sept 30, 1966, Secret, in TNA, 
PREM 13/1040.  
37 See UCHE, Oil, British Interests, p. 122. 
38 See Telegram 82010 from the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria, Nov 9, 1966, 
Secret, Priority, Limdis, in NARA, Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 Nigeria-US. 
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Igbo-controlled areas.39 In circumstance like these, the British position was 
rather ambiguous, for on one hand the Cabinet supported the federal 
government with the aim of maintaining a unified Nigeria, but on the other 
hand London had not given any assurance not to recognise Biafra in case it 
became an independent State with which to do business. A few days before 
the secession of Biafra, British investments in the country were estimated at 
over 220 million pounds. Political collapse, the Cabinet’s experts thought, 
would harm business confidence and probably put an end to the economic 
advantages of a single large market. In case of independence, Britain was 
supposed to avoid any formal recognition as long as possible, but keeping 
its lines open to the East. Nigeria’s share of the world oil market was still 
very small and the Middle East was always supposed to have a big block of 
supplies due to its enormous reserves. However, the outlook for the West 
African country was very encouraging, for by the early 1970s production 
was expected to reach 100 million tons a year, compared with 30 million in 
1967.40 As regarded oil exports, almost 40 percent of the crude oil went to 
the U.K., 15 percent to West Germany and around 10 percent to France and 
Canada. Other important markets were South America and the Caribbean, 
the U.S. and Northern Europe.41 With such figures, the future of Nigeria 
looked even brighter than expected and civil strife was in the interest of no 
one. In substance, Britain adopted a neutral line in public, but practically 
sympathised with the federals, being also their traditional arms suppliers. 
At the same time, Whitehall did not categorically rule out recognition of 
Biafra.42
                                                 
39 See O. IBEANU – R. LUCKHAM, Nigeria: Political Violence, Governance and Corporate 
Responsibility in a Petro-State, in M. KALDOR – T.L. KARL – Y. SAID, eds., Oil Wars, London-
New York, NY, Pluto Press, 2007, p. 60.  
 Economic interests left no choice to Britain but preferring one 
Nigeria. Apart from oil investments, British firms dominated the local 
banking system and London hosted the headquarters of the United Africa 
40 See O.P.D. Meeting, Friday 12th May, 1967 – Brief for the Minister: Possible Blockade and 
Secession of Eastern Region of Nigeria, 11 May 1967, Confidential, in TNA, POWE 63/238, 
Oil Industry Activity in Nigeria, 1967-1968, PET 56/419/A1 Pt 2. 
41 See Nigerian Oil in the Balance, in «Petroleum Press Service», June 1967, in TNA, POWE 
63/238, PET 56/419/A1 Pt 2. 
42 In her diaries, Lady Barbara Castle writes that the government was seeking to avoid a 
commitment to either side in the hostilities, though arms had been supplied to Lagos in respect 
of orders accepted before the outbreak of the civil war. Any further request of substantial 
supplies of arms, however, had been rejected. See B. CASTLE, The Castle Diaries 1964-1970, 
London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984, p. 276.      
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Company, which was responsible for over one third of all Nigerian trade. 
Finally, about one tenth of British oil imports came from Nigeria in 1966 
and Britain accounted for half of foreign investments there.43 By reading 
records, we can assume that the American conclusions were very similar to 
those of the British, as the White House was trying to keep quite a balanced 
stand in the dispute, advocating unity but avoiding to be tarred by either 
side. The truth was that the United States had no right leverage on Nigeria, 
which was mainly in the U.K. sphere of influence.44 As concerned arms, 
instead, Washington had decided not to supply any side for several reasons. 
First of all, due to the Vietnam escalation the Administration was not 
interested in getting involved in another foreign war. Then, the State 
Department had stated that the war was an internal matter to be solved only 
by Nigerians. Third, the Johnson Administration had started to turn down 
Kennedy’s African policy.45 Finally, little attention was being given to 
African affairs because of the recognition that Africa was not going to 
become a major actor on the global political stage for a long time.46
     Nigerian oil in mid 1967 had become even more important due to the 
disruptions in the Middle East. With the outbreak of the Six Days’ War the 
Suez Canal had been obstructed and, though extra oil was available in the 
Persian Gulf at the time, this could not be lifted because of tanker 
shortage.
            
47
                                                 
43 See YOUNG, The Labour Governments, p. 201. 
 A round trip from Britain to the Persian Gulf via the Cape of 
Good Hope took sixty-eight days, while a round trip from Britain to Nigeria 
44 See Memorandum from Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council Staff to the 
President’s Special Assistant (Rostow): Nigeria, May 25, 1967, Secret, in FRUS 1964-1968, 
Vol. XXIV, doc. 385, pp. 654-657. 
45 Kennedy had planned a new image of foreign policy for the United States. The White 
House tried to identify with African aspirations and kept an ongoing dialogue with most 
African leaders, including some regarded as radicals. The effort was quite successful and the 
Administration managed to appear as the most pro-African Presidency. See L.A. PICARD, U.S. 
Foreign Policy toward Southern Africa, in D.P. FORSYTHE, ed., American Foreign Policy in 
an Uncertain World, Lincoln, NB, and London, University of Nebraska Press, 1984, p. 455. 
46 See SHEPARD, Nigeria, pp. 37-38. 
47 Once the anti-West emotions of the Arab-Israeli war had peaked, Arab internal rivalries 
began again to assert their primacy over the common cause against the Jewish State. 
Disagreements over the oil embargo strategy revived the classic “revolutionary-reactionary” 
antagonism. While radical States like Egypt, Syria, Algeria and Iraq demanded that the 
embargo be continued, conservatives monarchies like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya wanted 
it lifted. See M.S. DAOUDI – M.S. DAJANI, The 1967 Oil Embargo Revisited, in «Journal of 
Palestine Studies», XIII, 2, Winter 1984, p. 70. 
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took only twenty days. On grounds of this, it was estimated that the denial 
of Nigerian crude would reduce the oil available in Western Europe by 5 
percent.48 Denial of Nigerian oil, due to the FMG naval forces’ blockade 
against oil shipments from Biafra, could hit Britain more than other 
European countries and in that case rationing was expected. Moreover, loss 
of oil from West Africa was thought to seriously affect the balance of 
payments, for the replacement of Nigerian oil with the higher priced 
American oil would cost another 1.3 million dollars a day.49 The tacit 
alliance between Britain and the Military Government was also shown by 
the ongoing supply of arms to Lagos, though sophisticated weapons and 
aircrafts were denied. During the war, the sole British interest was that the 
economy be brought back to a condition in which London’s trade and 
investments in the country could be further developed, in particular as 
concerned access to oil installations. Whitehall was not contrary to political 
separation, but in that case full economic co-operation had to be maintained 
among different States. Apart from this, there was another danger 
disturbing the Americans in particular: in case of total arms embargo, they 
suspected, the Federal Government could look at the Soviet Union for help 
and, in case of victory against Biafra, the Russian might try to secure a 
permanent foothold in Nigeria and from there develop further infiltration.50 
According to the words of Harold Wilson himself, Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom in those days, Britain had been during the colonial era, 
and still was since independence, Nigeria’s traditional supplier of arms and 
the military in power were all British trained.51
                                                 
48 See Brief for Minister of State: Nigerian Tanker Blockade: Effects on Oil Supplies, July 6, 
1967, Secret, in TNA, FCO/38/111.   
 Refusal to deliver weapons 
was considered as a hostile act against a Commonwealth country whose 
government London recognised and whose integrity supported. Moreover, 
the cause of Nigerian unity was backed by the Organisation of African 
Unity. Since there were over 2,000 tribes in Africa, in order to avoid 
49 See Brief for Minister of State: Nigerian Tanker Blockade – Effects on Oil Supplies, July 6, 
1967, Secret, in TNA, POWE 63/238, PET 56/419/A1 Pt 2. 
50 See Letter from E.G. Norris to Sir J. Henniker-Major: British Policy towards Nigeria, Aug 
21, 1967, Confidential, in TNA, POWE 63/238, PET 56/419/A1 Pt 2. 
51 In the early 1970s, France had become the largest arms supplier for Africa, with Russia 
second, Britain third and the United States fourth. Finally, there was a diversified category of 
others selling together more than the Soviet Union. See I.W. ZARTMAN, Coming Political 
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“Balkanisation” the OAU had accepted colonial boundaries.52 Apart from 
that, soon after Biafran declaration of independence Gowon had written to 
Wilson, immediately clarifying that any attempt at recognition of that State 
would be regarded as an unfriendly act towards Nigeria. Wilson needed no 
such warning, for he was ready to supply the federal government with all 
the arms necessary to win the war quickly.53 As an evidence of this, in 
November 1967 the Commonwealth Secretary affirmed that Lagos was 
already winning and that by then British interests would best be served by a 
quick end of the war, particularly through the capture of Port Harcourt. For 
that reason, the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee had agreed that 
British policy on arms should be relaxed in order to supply more 
sophisticated weapons to the federal government, though aircrafts and 
weapons of mass destruction were always denied.54 The British position 
was quite easy to understand if we consider that before the cessation of 
exports Nigeria was producing thirty million tons a year of crude oil, 
twenty-five of which drilled by Shell-BP, mainly in the Eastern region. The 
Government was aware of the importance of Nigerian oil, especially as a 
source of future supplies and as a major British overseas investment.55 For 
all these reasons, the High Commissioner in Lagos stated that British 
interests were better safeguarded through a Nigeria divided into twelve 
States, none of which strong enough to secede and thus interfere with the 
large and valuable internal market. Therefore, the course of the war 
favouring the federal government was to the advantage of Britain.56
    The Anglo-Saxon powers’ attitude was very prudent also because Africa 
played rather a secondary role in the context of their world wide strategy. 
Nuclear confrontation between the superpowers for events in the black 
continent was very unlikely and the West was not dependent on Africa for 
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basing and staging facilities for operations elsewhere in the world.  On the 
contrary, British economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa were substantial, 
since the region took 12 percent of Britain’s total exports and 20 percent of 
its imports came from the U.K. Moreover, 15 percent of British private 
investments was in Africa. As concerned political interests, it was pivotal 
for African countries not to align themselves with the Eastern bloc and at 
the same time their vote at the United Nations was quite important for the 
continuation of Western policies.57 The Americans did not rule out the 
possibility for Biafra to win the war and gain formal recognition from 
African and European countries, first of all Portugal and France. Whatever 
the outcome of the war, the CIA believed that political instability would 
plague Nigeria for rather a long time to come. In the meantime, the Anglo-
American refusal to sell Lagos heavy weapons had already provoked a shift 
in Nigeria’s foreign relations. Due to Moscow’s promptness to sell military 
equipment, its influence in Nigeria had risen. Moreover, Eastern European 
countries and the United Arab Republic had also contributed to the FMG’s 
war effort. Despite Gowon’s little confidence in the Soviets and his hope 
for the U.S. to furnish aid for reconstruction and economic development, 
the post-war outlook for Nigeria was closer to non-alignment and less pro-
West than in the past.58 It was also argued that if Britain withdrew support 
to Lagos, the FMG would have no choice but turning to the Soviets, whose 
propaganda could encourage the Africans to take over the oil industry and 
acquire Russian technical expertise.59 This perception was not shared by the 
French, who were believed to assist the Biafran effort with weapons, with 
the aim of breaking up Nigeria and thus favouring their French speaking 
client States in the area.60
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 Paris welcomed more concessions in Nigeria, but 
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them by weakening Lagos rather than by making a deal with the FMG.61 
There is no doubt that the civil war had spurred the interests of several 
foreign powers, thus casting Nigeria into the international arena. However, 
despite American investments in Nigerian oil, these were mainly offshore 
from the Mid-Western region, which was part of the federal territory. 
Hence, the company promptly paid royalties to the FMG and the White 
House had no serious interest to consider the war other than an internal 
affair of Nigeria.62 The French oil company SAFRAP, instead, was accused 
by the federal government to lean more towards Biafra, due to French 
sympathies for the secessionists and their formal recognition by three 
French speaking countries, that is Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Haiti. The oil 
exploration and exploitation licenses of SAFRAP were not revoked by 
Nigeria, since Lagos had applied to the European Economic Community as 
an associate member and the French had a veto power.63 Nevertheless, 35 
percent of the equity interests of SAFRAP was acquired by the FMG.64 As 
concerned the Soviets, the Kremlin had never advocated the Eastern 
region’s secession and a few weeks after the outbreak of the war, the USSR 
moved in on the side of the FMG to supply heavy weapons, such as 
aircrafts. In doing this, Moscow knew that most OAU members backed 
Gowon’s junta and this allowed the Soviets to side with many African 
States.65
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3. Output Growth, the end of the Civil War, and Economic Nationalism 
 
After more than one year of fighting, the British support for the FMG was 
paying its dividends66 and Shell-BP was already pressing ahead with the 
project to build a new pipeline and terminal in the Mid-Western region, 
hoping to resume production up to 18-20 millions tons by the end of 
1969.67  From the American point of view, the advent of the Nixon 
Administration and the personality of the Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs, Kissinger, implied that black Africa became part 
of a wider Cold War scenario and Washington’s involvement had to follow 
the principles of the confrontation with Moscow. In light of this, the new 
Presidency knew that the Kremlin did not have any vital interest in Nigeria, 
but the Soviets’ move to become a major arms supplier for Lagos was to be 
seen from several points of view. First of all, this was in contrast with their 
low profile in the continent and matched the wider interest of a new 
foothold in the Middle East.68 Once in office, Nixon ordered a study on 
America’s interests and options in Africa and Nigeria and from that 
document it was confirmed that, although Washington had no vital interests 
in Nigeria or Biafra, it was pivotal to keep stability in the continent and 
Nigerian unity had to be preserved in order to avoid a fragmentation of the 
federation and a setting of continuing hostility with a likely arms race 
among the fragments of the federation itself. Even more important was the 
necessity to avoid great power rivalries in the region and avoid the 
resentment of the majority of the African States on a crucial issue which 
could also set a precedent for secession elsewhere.69
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 As concerned the 
Soviets, the Department of State did not regard their influence in Nigeria as 
a serious problem, but it was to be kept under observation, though 
Washington was quite confident that the FMG would not compromise its 
67 See Shell-BP’s Interests in Nigeria, undated, Confidential, in TNA, POWE 63/406, PET 
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independence to be controlled by Moscow.70 On the other hand, Moscow 
had no intention to get involved in a Vietnam-like quagmire and replace 
Britain as a major arms supplier for Nigeria. Such a policy irritated the 
FMG, which accused the Soviets of being interested in the prolongation of 
the war to protect the growth of their influence in the area. On the other 
hand, the Americans thought that if Moscow worked for the FMG’s quick 
and decisive victory, there would be the risk of deteriorating the relations 
with France and provoking an increase of French aid and involvement, too. 
Therefore, it was likely for the Soviets to seek a compromise solution 
allowing Moscow to keep most of their gains in federal Nigeria, while 
keeping their prestige intact in the East.71 After all, the Soviet presence in 
black Africa was something recent and the Western oriented African élites 
looked at the Russians as strangers with unfamiliar habits and language. 
From a certain point of view, this was an advantage for Moscow, since for 
those annoyed by former colonialists the Russians could represent an 
alternative to the West. However, even in the countries where the Soviet 
influence was more significant, few of the ruling class had turned to the 
USSR for ideological inspiration. Therefore, rather than spreading 
Marxism-Leninism, in the late sixties the Kremlin opted for an image of 
reliable power, also through the export of arms to conservative regimes, but 
without giving up backing clandestine organisations struggling against 
Western oriented governments wherever possible.72
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the presence of China was not to forget. The black continent was very 
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countries, through a strong trade expansion, always without rejecting 
financial and military aid to insurrectionist movements.73
    The war had shown once again how dependent on foreign governments 
and companies Nigeria was. The country was becoming a crossroad of 
foreign interests and rivalries and this sensitised the FMG to pursue 
economic nationalism. The indecision of the trans-national oil corporations 
about whether to pay royalties to the Federal or the Biafran government had 
a serious impact on the military rulers, who started doubting about the 
reliability of foreigners. The conflict had obviously increased State 
involvement in the economy to manage the war effort and at the same time 
the government began to feel confident about setting up a national oil 
industry, which had the potential to become the backbone of the economy 
and a diplomatic tool in the hands of the military.
  
74 That is why further 
legislation was passed to improve governmental influence and control on 
the oil industry. In particular, the Petroleum Decree No. 51 of 1969 vested 
the whole ownership and control of all petroleum found under or upon any 
Nigerian lands or territorial waters with the Nigerian government. The 
licenses to explore, prospect and mine were to be granted only to Nigerian 
citizens or companies incorporated in Nigeria. Oil prospecting licenses 
allowed a company to prospect and drill for oil, while exploration licences 
allowed only exploration. This new prospecting policy attracted quite a 
good number of foreign companies from the United States and Europe.75 
This was not surprising, since the Gulf Oil Company had already 
investments in Nigeria valued at around 150 million dollars, while other 
companies, such as Mobil, Texaco and Tenneco had investments worth 
millions. The U.S. government encouraged these investments and was 
interested in safeguarding oil installations, in whose protection from air 
attacks the FMG was committed.76
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corporations, while the 1969 Decree ensured recruitment and training of 
Nigerians, thus giving them the necessary know-how to manage the 
industry and implementing a gradual process of Nigerianisation.77 The 
American growing interest in the Nigerian oil industry was an evidence of 
how that raw material was becoming more and more vital for national 
security. Despite CIA optimism on the access to oil world resources for the 
United States, diversification was pivotal to avoid any threat to American 
imports. According to Washington’s analyses, enlargement of OPEC 
membership made an oil embargo on a wide market harder to implement, 
for many major producers were dependent on oil revenues to finance future 
economic growth. Nevertheless, the dominant position of American oil 
companies in an international market in which more than half the oil traded 
was foreign produced and sold by US companies was believed to represent 
an important buffer against any concerted action against American access 
to imported crude.78 At the same time, it could not be ignored that Arab 
producers were acquiring such a big surplus of financial reserves that they 
were already able to stop production and still maintain the necessary 
imports for a considerable span of time. In case of combined Arab 
embargo, Western Europe could become a competitor of the United States 
for the access to the remaining crude.79 Such an outlook was worrying the 
British as well, especially in a moment when the American Administration 
had ordered a study on a possible oil import policy review with the aim of 
liberalising the system from a regime of protection quotas to a control by 
tariffs. Though Nixon rejected this review and kept the protection system,80
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London was concerned that in the near future the Americans should rely 
more on supplies from the Middle East and the Arabs. Although such an 
event could allow British companies to sell cheap crude to the lucrative 
78 See Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency: Prospects for US Access to 
World Oil Over the Next 15 Years or so, Aug 28, 1969, Secret, in E.C. KEEFER (gen. ed.) – L. 
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D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 2011, doc. 8, pp. 25-35. 
79 See Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Resources 
and Food Policy (Katz) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Trezise): 
Comments on Task Force Paper on Possible Foreign Oil Supply Interruptions, Sept 26, 1969, 
Limited Official Use, in NARA, RG 220, Records of the Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import 
Control, Box 21, Agency Comments to Staff, Department of State Comments on Fact Papers.  
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American market, on the other hand the new tariff system might stop the 
downward pressure on prices.81
    The civil war ended in January 1970 with the fall of Biafra and in his 
Report to the Congress on Foreign Policy President Nixon mirrored his 
doctrine, implying strong regional actors able to contain communist 
insurgence, thus allowing Washington to avoid any direct involvement 
abroad. Quoting also the civil war in Nigeria, the President stated that the 
United States would not intervene in internal affairs of African nations, 
supporting their right of independence and respecting their national 
integrity. However, in case of threat from outside forces, Washington was 
ready to defend its friends and their independent development.
 
82 A clear 
allusion to any communist penetration into an area which was becoming 
pivotal for American strategic interests. By then, Nigeria was clearly 
emerging as one of the top ten oil producers in the world and its output was 
expected to reach at least two million barrels per day by 1974, with a Shell-
BP investment which was already 350 million pounds. All this implied also 
that Nigeria’s foreign exchange available for imports could increase and 
Britain held about 30 percent of the market. By keeping the same level of 
trade, British exports to the West African country were supposed to 
increase from 75 million (excluding arms sales) up to 140 million pounds 
within four years.83 As we can see, with the end of the war the future for 
Nigeria seemed very bright and the increasing role of oil international 
politics was becoming more and more recognised.84
                                                 
81 See U.S. Oil Import Policy Review, Jan 29, 1970, Confidential – Guard, in TNA, FCO 
67/399, Policy on Imports in U.S.A., ML 304/2, Part A.  
 The oil boom of the 
early 1970s paved the way to a real competition among foreign companies 
in Nigeria, beyond which the American and British governments showed 
themselves as commercial rivals. In virtue of OPEC aggressive policies, 
Nigerian oil represented a valid alternative to traditional sources of supply. 
As an evidence of this, the British companies were planning to invest 
82 See R.M. NIXON, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: A New Strategy for Peace. A Report to 
the Congress, Feb 18, 1970, in FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. E-5, Part 1, doc. 7, in 
http://history.state.gov. 
83 See J. Wilson to Mr. Wright: Medium Term Assessment of the U.K. Economy, Feb 26, 1970, 
Confidential, in TNA, FCO 65/806, Oil in Nigeria, JWN 12/1, Part A. 
84 Between 1948 and 1970 world energy consumption had risen by around 196 percent. In 
particular, oil consumption had grown by 398 percent from 1949 to 1970. See A. NOUSCHI, 
Pétrole et relations internationales de 1945 à nos jours, Paris, Armand Colin, 1995, p. 35.  
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further 310 million pounds in the following six years, while BP had offered 
to build a second refinery in partnership with the federal government. In 
order to realise how suspicious even of the Americans the British were, and 
how commercial rivalry was prevailing over long term alliances, suffice it 
to say that no details of Shell-BP’s plans for future investments were to be 
revealed to the American Administration’s officers who periodically met 
their British colleagues.85 Mineral and petroleum development accounted 
also for almost three-fourths of American private investments in Africa and 
in a situation like that it was not credible for the United States to leave a 
growing market in the hands of the Europeans.86 This can be realised 
through the words of the Secretary of State, William Rogers, when he 
stated that, despite the special relationship between some African countries 
and their former European mother countries, which Washington did not 
deny, the Administration’s purpose was to give all developing nations equal 
access for export to all international markets, thus urging the elimination of 
preferential tariffs putting American goods at a competitive disadvantage in 
many African countries.87 Despite optimism, the situation for the 
Americans was getting more and more urgent due to increasing signs that 
domestic output was about to peak.88
                                                 
85Outline Brief for Anglo-American Oil Talks, Item 4 (b): Nigeria, Jan 5-7, 1970, Confidential, 
in TNA, FCO 65/806, JWN 12/1, Part A.  
 On grounds of this, the Atlantic power 
had to exploit Alaskan fields and find new sources of supplies, thus 
augmenting imports from unstable areas of the world. Moreover, oil was 
not the only source of energy which was becoming short. Coal production 
was languishing as well and producers were no longer able to satisfy 
demands from power stations, while electricity shortage caused the risk of 
86 Much of Africa’s mineral wealth was still untapped. It was estimated that the black continent 
held 8 percent of the world’s petroleum reserves, 90 percent of the world’s cobalt, 40 percent 
of its platinum, 12 percent of its natural gas, and 30 percent of its uranium, not to mention other 
raw materials such as gold, copper, diamonds and so on. Besides, a great part of the continent 
was still unsurveyed for minerals, and this raised the prospect that substantial new discoveries 
could be made. See G.F. ERB, Africa and the International Economy: A U.S. Response, in 
WHITAKER, ed., Africa and the United States, p. 64.   
87 See Letter from Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon: U.S. and Africa in the 70’s, 
Mar 26, 1970, in FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. E-5, Part 1, doc. 11, in http://history.state.gov. 
88 See Anglo-American Oil Talks 5-7 January 1970: Item 1(b) USA-Alaska, in TNA, FCO 
67/444, C399891, Confidential. 
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power failures and the growth of the gas industry was slowed down by 
dwindling reserves.89
    In the meantime, the Nigerian government had certainly become more 
nationalistic in foreign and economic affairs, though Washington’s policy 
makers still believed that Gowon would always follow a pragmatic 
approach. This was made easier by the fact that the country had emerged 
from the war in generally good economic conditions. On balance, the 
federal government had not incurred any external war debt and the rise in 
oil production, already double than pre-war levels, was a promising factor 
for the future. Lagos had also remained favourably disposed towards the 
United Kingdom, but was rather suspicious of the United States, generally 
believed to have morally, if not materially, helped Biafra during the war. 
Finally, Gowon had started a more activist policy in the continent, which 
the Americans suspected it could aid black nationalist movements in 
Southern Africa, where Portuguese territories and white regimes, such as 
South Africa and Rhodesia, lay. Nigeria was by then able to spread the 
image of a black country which had been able to suppress a foreign-backed 
attempt to divide the nation and such an attitude was made easier by the oil 
boom.
    
90 The country was rapidly becoming one of the most promising 
producers in the world and its best outlook seemed to lie offshore. In the 
great Delta of the Niger River, in fact, there were by those times forty-four 
fields, only seven of which were already producing. By virtue of this, the 
government started to talk about participation up to an “agreed 
percentage”.91
                                                 
89 See Letter from R.H. Willmott to J.A. Beckett, 15 May 1970, in TNA, FCO 67/399, ML 
304/2, Part A. 
 According to U.S. estimates, Nigerian oil production, which 
had already reached one million barrels per day in April, was expected to 
average 1.3 million the following year and by the end of the decade could 
exceed four million. Nigeria was also the world’s largest exporter of 
peanuts, the second largest exporter of cocoa and an important one of palm 
90 See Special Report Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency: Nigeria after the War, May 
28, 1970, Secret, No Foreign Dissem, in FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. E-5, Part 1, doc. 194, in 
http://history.state.gov. 
91 See F.J. GARDNER, No Letup Seen in Nigeria’s Startling Production Surge, July 6, 1970, in 
«The Oil and Gas Journal», in TNA, FCO 67/403, Projects by Oil Companies in Nigeria, ML 
310/1, Part A, 1970. 
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and timber products, rubber, and tin.92 In the meantime, new concessions 
were being given to American, German, Japanese and Nigerian companies, 
with the latter receiving half the acreage, mainly in-shore and concentrated 
in two very promising areas. This competition was going to break the 
monolithic front BP-Shell had previously enjoyed, but above all London 
was concerned about the prospect for the Nigerian Government to set up a 
national oil company able to affect the future of the oil industry as a 
whole.93 Though still a poor country with a pro capite income not much 
better than neighbouring nations and low level of technological 
development, Nigeria had some assets providing considerable economic 
potential. The British still controlled two-thirds of the productive capacity 
and U.S. companies were second with investments of around 500 million 
dollars. Beside trade issues, Nigeria was revealing itself a very important 
market for political reasons, too. Despite the likely setting up of a national 
oil corporation, the Americans were still convinced that the Nigerians had 
no intention to nationalise the oil industry. Moreover, though the FMG was 
grateful to the Soviets for their assistance during the war, so long as 
Gowon, or someone with similar views was in power, was in power, 
Washington thought there would be little likelihood for the Kremlin to 
increase its influence in the country.94
 
          
4. OPEC Membership 
 
On September 2, 1970, a watershed agreement was signed in Tripoli 
between Occidental Petroleum and the revolutionary government of 
Muammar Qaddafi, according to which there was an immediate increase of 
the posted price by thirty cents (from 2.23 to 2.53 dollars) and an additional 
two-cent-increase for the following five years, thus recognising the better 
quality of Libyan oil. Moreover, taxes on the company’s profits were 
                                                 
92 See Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to 
President Nixon: Report from the Secretary of State on “Nigeria Seven Months after the War”, 
undated, Confidential, in FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. E-5, Part 1, doc. 199, in 
http://history.state.gov. 
93 See Letter from A.F. Collings to B.L. Barder: Off-Shore Oil Concessions, Aug 12, 1970, 
Restricted, in TNA, FCO 67/403, ML 310/1, Part A, 1970. 
94 See National Intelligence Estimate: Prospects for Post-war Nigeria, Nov 2, 1970, NIE 64.2-
70, Secret, Controlled Dissem, in FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. E-5, Part 1, doc. 201, in 
http://history.state.gov.   
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brought from 50 to 58 percent.95 By the end of the month, first the other 
independents and then the majors signed the same agreement. Tripoli 
managed to control a production of almost two million barrels a day, by 
virtue of which it was stocking foreign exchange reserves able to act as a 
financial shield against foreign companies’ and governments’ offensives in 
case of economic war. Like Henry Kissinger writes, what was really 
historic about these settlements was their political implication. Theretofore, 
the oil companies had always managed to impose a unified price bargaining 
as a unit. Instead, this time the front had been split, thus shuttering one of 
the buffers between producing and consuming countries. This led to a 
“leapfrogging” system between Mediterranean suppliers and Persian Gulf 
producers, which did not accept competitors to receive larger incomes. 
However, in 1970 price increases were not perceived yet as something able 
to harm the West’s economies and change living standards, since the 
starting point was still very low and prices were lower than those of 
American oil. Finally, both the American and the British government 
thought that no strategic interests were involved in the commercial dispute 
between producers and companies.96 Instead, for the first time exporters 
had realised that the energy market was changing, so that in December the 
OPEC Conference of Caracas issued Resolution 120, stating that those 
companies which did not accept taxes and royalties imposed by OPEC, 
would be denied access to supplies. It was also decided that the minimum 
tax on oil profits would always be 55 percent.97
    Compared with Middle Eastern instability and emotionality, Nigeria 
offered quite a “rational” scenario and to the Department of State it 
appeared that if OPEC succeeded in shutting down Persian Gulf and North 
African production, the magnitude of the problems for consumers would be 
so high that the stoppage of Nigerian output would not make so much 
difference.
  
98
                                                 
95 See SEYMOUR, OPEC, pp. 70-71. 
 Therefore, OPEC membership for Nigeria was not supposed to 
alter oil policy and there was little chance for the FMG to curtail or shut 
96 See H.A. KISSINGER, Years of Upheaval, Boston, MA, Toronto, Little, Brown and 
Company, 1982, p. 862. 
97 See SEYMOUR, OPEC, p. 75. 
98 See Telegram 01106 from Amembassy Lagos to SecState WashDC: Nigerian Oil Policy, Feb 
5, 1971, Action AF-05, 051445Z, Section 1 of 2, Secret, LimDis, NoForn, in NARA, RG 59, 
A1 5712, Box 7, Lot 74D409, PET 1, General Policy.  
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down production even in response to OPEC requests.99 Nigerian oil was 
turning into a sort of bailout for the West, especially Western Europe, in 
case of international energy crisis. The posted price was by then imposed 
by producers when on February 14, 1971, a new five-year-agreement was 
signed in Tehran. An event like that was an evidence that the majors’ 
monopoly had been worn away and that consequently producers had the 
power to seriously influence the market.100 A similar document was signed 
on April 2 in Tripoli, whose government gained another increase of the 
posted price up to 3.32 dollars a barrel. David Barran, Chairman of Shell, 
commented that the buyers’ market was by then over,101 but the Western 
powers did not seem so concerned, for they estimated that those agreements 
would benefit their balance of payments as well. In fact, oil producers had 
to spend huge amounts of money to import not only weapons, but also 
technology and manufacture products from the West.102 However, Libyan 
radical policies could be a prelude to a real nationalisation of the oil 
industry. In order to ward off such a danger, the Saudi Oil Minister, Zaki 
Yamani, suggested a compromise implying a State participation in all oil 
activities. Yamani affirmed that this was the only way to moderate the Arab 
radical regimes’ requests, since the producers’ interests would be linked to 
those of the companies.103
                                                 
99 See Telegram 01106 from Amembassy Lagos to SecState WashDC: Nigerian Oil Policy, Feb 
5, 1971, Action AF-05, 051343Z, Section 2 of 2, Secret, LimDis, NoForn, in NARA, RG 59, 
A1 5712, Box 7, Lot 74D409, PET 1, General Policy. 
 In this context, the British High Commissioner 
in Lagos stated that Nigeria had become a country worth taking seriously 
and a friend worth having, since it was by then the most populous and 
powerful black nation in the world, with an army of a quarter-of-a-million. 
100 See F. PETRINI, L’arma del petrolio: lo “shock” petrolifero e il confronto Nord-Sud. Parte 
prima. L’Europa alla ricerca di un’alternativa: la Comunità tra dipendenza energetica ed 
egemonia  statunitense, in CAVIGLIA- VARSORI, eds., Dollari, petrolio, pp. 85-86. 
101 See D. YERGIN, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, London, Simon & 
Schuster, 1991, p. 582.  
102 Arms exports from the United States to Iran grew from 103 million dollars in 1970 to more 
than 550 in 1972, while transfers towards Saudi Arabia grew from 15 to 312 million dollars in 
the same period. See F.G. GAUSE III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 22.  
103 See Airgram A-50 from AmEmbassy Jidda to SecState Washington DC: The Tripoli Oil 
Negotiations and Their Implications as Seen by SAG Minister of Petroleum Zaki Yamani – 
Enclosure: Memorandum of Conversation: Minister of Petroleum Zaki Yamani Reflects on 
Events and Implications of Tripoli Oil Negotiations, March 31, 1971, in NARA, RG 59, SNF 
1970-73, PET 15-2 LIBYA, Secret, LimDis. 
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Oil production had already reached 1.5 million barrels per day and within 
three years it was supposed to put Nigeria amongst the really big producers, 
comparable with Venezuela. Export trade figures brought Nigeria within 
the top twenty of British markets, with a level exceeding those of India and 
the Soviet Union. In terms of European oil consumption, the West African 
country was a valuable source of low-sulphur short-haul crude and 
negotiations were in progress with Shell-BP for a new posted price. This 
made Nigeria pivotal for African policies in general and there was someone 
in the government, the High Commissioner wrote, who argued that the 
attitude towards South Africa and above all arms trade with that country 
were the crucial test of friendship for black Africa.104
    In May, the FMG established by Decree No. 18 the Nigerian National 
Oil Corporation (NNOC), mainly as a consequence of OPEC Resolution 
No. XVI.90 of 1968 calling for member countries to acquire at least 51 
percent of foreign equity interests and to participate more actively in all 
aspects of oil operations. This was the first step towards the Nigerianisation 
of the oil industry, since NNOC served as the main agent of the government 
in the partial nationalisation of that economic segment.
    
105 The new 
company was granted oil leases over a large area and allowed to take over 
the concessions withdrawn from foreign companies in the course of time as 
new agreements were arranged. NNOC was not itself an operating 
company, but a holding company providing guidelines for its subsidiaries 
and implementing government decisions and intentions.106 Almost 
simultaneously with Decree No.18 and in line with the Tripoli agreements, 
on May 10 Shell-BP managed to reach a five-year settlement for a new 
posted price at 3.21 dollars with the federal government, followed two days 
later by similar agreements with Gulf and Mobil, while SAFRAP was 
allowed to resume operations in the Eastern region in exchange of greater 
Nigerian participation.107
                                                 
104 See Foreign and Commonwealth Office Diplomatic Report No. 232/71: Effect on Anglo-
Nigerian Relations of the Sale of Arms to South Africa, Apr 17, 1971, JWN 3/548/4, 
Confidential, in TNA, FCO 67/580, Oil Affairs in Nigeria, ML 310/1, Part A, 1971. 
 On the other hand, American investments in the 
country had risen to 600 million dollars and the outlook was for further 
expansion. Over a five-year-span of time, according to the National 
105 See KHAN, Nigeria, p. 22. 
106 See ONOH, The Nigerian Oil Economy, p. 32. 
107 See R.H. Ellingworth to Mr. Bottomley: Nigerian Oil, June 7, 1971, Confidential, in TNA, 
FCO 67/580, ML 310/1, Part A, 1971. 
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Security Council, the Nixon Administration pursued the aim of increasing 
U.S. access to resources and markets, while encouraging the Nigerian 
government’s moderate posture towards the superpowers.108 Aware of two 
basic facts, Nigeria joined OPEC in July 1971. First of all, within thirteen 
years oil production had risen from 5,000 to 1.5 million barrels per day. As 
an outcome of this, from a contribution of 1 percent to total export earnings 
in 1958, the share of oil revenues had increased to nearly 75 percent of total 
exports. The economy had become heavily dependent on the oil industry 
and in light of this Nigeria was living in an economic environment 
influenced by circumstances beyond its control. International supply and 
demand conditions determined Nigerian export revenues, limiting Lagos’s 
ability to attract investments towards other sectors of the economy and set 
the terms of foreign exchange.109 Therefore, OPEC membership and 
consensus on production and pricing policies were also seen as a buffer 
between the country and the world market.110 On grounds of this, the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office was always quite optimistic on the 
Nigerian attitude towards the oil companies, even when the government had 
requested a 35 percent participation, outbidding Iran and the other Gulf 
States, which seemed ready to settle for an initial 20 percent. Due to 
shortage of foreign exchange and the need to implement the development 
plan, Nigeria was regarded as a reasonable and reliable partner for the 
companies,111
                                                 
108 See Airgram A-22 from the Department of State to the Embassy in Nigeria: Nigeria – 
Policy Planning Paper, June 21, 1971, Secret, Noforn, Limdis, in NARA, RG 59, Central Files 
1970-73, POL 1 Nigeria-U.S. 
 though it was not going to forego any gains won by other 
109 See P.O. OLAYIWOLA, Petroleum and Structural Change in a Developing Country: The 
Case of Nigeria, New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1987, p. 151.  
110 See KHAN, Nigeria, p. 29. 
111 In December 1971, the British had implemented the decision to withdraw their troops from 
the Persian Gulf, thus leaving a vacuum that both Arabs and Iranians wanted to fill. Once 
accepted independence of Bahrain, the Shah did not want to give up Abu Musa and the Tunbs 
islands, located at the entrance of the Gulf and pivotal to the security of oil trade through the 
Strait of Hormuz. Using the Iranian occupation of the islands as a pretext, on December 7 
Qaddafi nationalised all assets and interests of the British Petroleum Exploration Company, BP 
partner in Libya. Information Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State C. 
Robert Moore to the Acting Secretary of State Irwin: Nationalization of British Petroleum in 
Libya, December 7, 1971, 7119678, in NARA, RG 59, SNF 1970-73, PET 15-2 LIBYA, 
Confidential. 
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OPEC members.112 In particular, the Development Plan covering the period 
from 1970 to 1974 pursued economic independence through the 
nationalisation of at least 55 percent of four strategic industries, i.e., iron 
and steel, petro-chemical industries, fertiliser production, and petroleum 
products.113 Despite optimism, the British were always concerned that the 
Nigerians could use their oil as a political weapon over the issue of arms to 
South Africa and the policy towards Rhodesia, which had unilaterally 
declared independence in 1965 and where a white regime excluded from 
political life the African population. The Nigerians were still short of 
technical expertise to interrupt the oil flow, but they were strong enough to 
adopt a tougher posture towards consumers and companies.114 However, 
Gowon was regarded as a reasonable and sensible interlocutor, who did not 
advocate extremist African policies and always put Nigeria first. Therefore, 
both the Anglo-Saxon powers agreed that Lagos would not spend large 
amounts of money in support to foreign activities.115 Britain still 
maintained a 30 percent share of Nigerian imports, but in the meantime all 
foreign companies had to comply within two years with the Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Decree, commonly known as indigenisation decree, 
on grounds of which retail trade, small manufacturing, and service 
industries were reserved for Nigerians.116 The key point for Nigeria was 
that it belonged to what the West regarded as the safe part of the world in 
terms of energy sources location. Several OPEC governments had also 
announced the intention to limit oil production in order to secure their 
income over a longer span of time. If this policy were vigorously pursued, 
the Foreign Office was sure that prices would be further pushed up.117
                                                 
112 See G.B. Chalmers to Sir C. Pickard: Nigerian Oil Policy, 6 Dec 1971, Confidential, in 
TNA, FCO 67/581, Oil Affairs in Nigeria, ML 310/1, Part B, 1971. 
 
113 See K.A. East to G.B. Chalmers: Nigerian Oil Policy, 31 Dec 1971, ECO 12/1, 
Confidential in TNA, FCO 67/581, ML 310/1, Part B, 1971. 
114 See G.B. Chalmers to Mr Keeble and Mr. Bottomley: Nigeria - Oil, 24 Jan 1972, 
Confidential, in TNA, FCO 65/1226, Production of Oil in Nigeria, JWN 12/1, Part A 1-50, 
1972. 
115 See Memorandum of Conversation: US/UK Talks on Africa – West Africa: Ghana and 
Nigeria, Mar 6-7, 1972, Agenda Item 2C, Confidential, in NARA, RG 59, Central Files 1970-
73, POL UK-US.  
116 See J. Wilson to G.B. Chalmers: Sir David Barran’s Call on the Secretary of State, 27 Mar 
1972, Confidential, in TNA, FCO 65/1226, JWN 12/1, Part A 1-50, 1972. 
117 On August 15, 1971, the Nixon Administration had decided to suspend the convertibility of 
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Dependence on OPEC was becoming a sort of geo-strategic trap for 
consumers and it was of paramount importance to replace oil with 
alternative sources in the future and for the following ten years at least try 
to acquire crude from other areas, such as Alaska and the North Sea.118
     The point was that Western governments had not realised how much 
developing countries were devoted to take control of their raw materials. At 
the 1972 third UNCTAD Conference at Santiago, Chile, most Third World 
countries did not spare attacks on multinational corporations and there were 
speeches advocating nationalisation of raw-material industries. A gradual 
reform of international trade was no longer regarded as enough to revolt 
against imperialistic interests. The conference led to an agreement to set up 
a commission charged with the drafting of a “Charter of the Economic 
Rights and Duties of States”, which specifically established the right to 
nationalisation.
  
119
                                                                                                       
decreasing the value of raw materials whose payments were made in the US currency. At first 
the companies declared that the Tehran Agreements already had a clause protecting from 
inflation and providing a 2.5 percent annual increase of the posted price. Nevertheless, the 
argument fell on deaf ears and another agreement, signed on January 20, 1972, on a further 
increase of the posted price had become inevitable, and it added 670 million dollars to Gulf 
States for that year. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Economic Research, 
Central Intelligence Agency: Oil Companies Compensate for Dollar Devaluation – The 
Geneva Agreement, Feb 1972, ER IM 72–15, Confidential, in FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. XXXVI, 
doc. 110, pp. 264-268. It is also important to remind that the U.S. balance of payments deficit 
was running at twice the record of 10.7 billion reached in 1970. For the first time in the 
century, American trade account ran into the red over a six-month period. See S. STRANGE, The 
Dollar Crisis 1971, in «International Affairs», XLVIII, 2, Apr 1972, p. 202.          
 In the meantime, another blow to British interests was, 
on June 1, the Iraqi nationalisation of the Iraq Petroleum Company, a 
consortium equally belonging to BP, Shell, Compagnie Française des 
Pétroles and Esso/Mobil and working in the North of the country. 
According to the Americans, such an event did not cause any 
insurmountable problems yet. First of all, although Iraqi production 
amounted to around one-tenth of the whole Middle Eastern output, it was 
difficult for the Iraqis to market nationalised oil. In any case, the majors 
were always believed to be able to deviate a part of their production in 
118 See Lord Rothschild to Mr. Armstrong: Oil Economics and Supplies, Apr 17, 1972, 
Confidential, in TNA, PREM 15/1836, International Oil; Meetings with Sir David Barran of 
Shell; Expropriation of Assets of Foreign Oil Companies in Nigeria; Meeting with Mr G.A. 
Wagner of Shell, Part 2, 1972 Apr 12-1973 Jun 04. 
119 See G. GARAVINI, Completing Decolonization: The 1973 “Oil Shock” and the Struggle for 
Economic Rights, in «The International History Review», XXXIII, 3, Sept 2011, p. 478. 
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order to make up for the deficit, unless OPEC showed an up to then 
unknown solidarity by denying the market new extractions.120 The 
American lack of concern was due to the very low stake of U.S. companies 
in IPC, so much so that the Department of State estimated losses in no more 
than fifty million dollars. Moreover, there was no reason to think that 
Moscow had backed and financed Baghdad’s decision.121
    Beside political stability, there were several factors favouring the future 
of Nigerian oil: first of all, air pollution problems in most parts of the 
industrialised world had made low-sulphur oil very sought after; then, the 
geographical position of the country favoured Nigeria as a supplier to 
Western Europe. Despite Libya’s proximity to the shores of Europe, 
Nigeria remained competitive with the North African country as a more 
secure supplier, due to the unpredictability of the Libyan regime. Finally, 
the Nigerian military regime was still pro-West in the international arena, 
though greater contacts with extremist African countries and militant oil 
producers like Algeria and Libya. Gowon was more and more conscious of 
his country’s potential and that was why it was important to reach a 
compromise on the participation negotiations begun on April 11, 1972, with 
an opening bid on the Nigerian side at 40 percent, to be increased to 51 
percent over the following seven years. More realistically, Downing Street 
thought that Lagos would be satisfied with a 35 percent participation, but 
the junta could afford to be tough because NNOC already had a 33⅓ 
percent interest in the Agip/Phillips combine and another 35 percent in 
SAFRAP’s operations in return for permission to resume activities in the 
East.
 
122
                                                 
120 See Department of State Memorandum for Mr. Henry A. Kissinger: Iraq’s Oil Company 
Nationalization, June 2, 1972, 7209617, S/S 4550, in NARA, Nixon Presidential Materials 
Project (thereafter NPMP), National Security Files (thereafter NSF), Middle East 1969-1974, 
Country File Iraq, Vol. I, Box 603, Folder 3, Confidential. 
 Negotiations on participation had started in March with OPEC 
members of the Persian Gulf. What Kissinger calls “galloping 
nationalisation” way a way to turn oil companies into mere management 
and marketing organisations, while producers were supposed to unilaterally 
121 See Department of State Memorandum to Mr. Willis C. Armstrong from Julius L. Katz: 
Iraqi Nationalization of IPC, June 5, 1972, Confidential, in NARA, RG 59, Central Files 1970-
73, PET 15-2 IRAQ. 
122 See J.R. Bretherton to N. Power: Oil in Nigeria, Aug 17, 1972, 56/419/8, Confidential, in 
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impose prices.123 From the producers’ point of view, instead, participation 
was a sort of launching for marketing operations, allowing them to become 
active protagonists on international markets. Yamani stated that such an 
agreement would further safeguard stability, since consuming nations 
having relations with national oil companies would stock a certain quantity 
of reserve crude, useful in case of world shortage of demand.124  Instead, 
once producers gained a participation share in oil operations, they also 
acquired a common interest to increase prices and profits. This overturned 
the previous system, based on a large volume of low cost sales, while the 
State had taxes as the only revenue. On the contrary, participation made 
taxes on production much less important than prices, thus paving the way to 
crude restrictions in order to keep prices high.125 In this context, Nigeria 
was showing itself quite different from Gulf negotiators. Unlike the 
Iranians, the Nigerians did not consider themselves as being threatened by 
neighbours and therefore they were not so interested in military hardware. 
Consequently, they were less disposed than the Shah to underwrite a 
friendship with Western powers.126 Moreover, U.S. government interests in 
that country were rather small compared with British ones, since the only 
American company significantly involved there was Gulf Oil. Therefore, an 
Anglo-American joint package was harder to offer in the negotiations, 
which the Nigerians wanted to conduct in a flexible yet aggressive and 
independent way.127
                                                 
123 See KISSINGER, Years of Upheaval, p. 866. 
 On the other hand, the Western African country could 
not withhold oil from the market for a long time, since Nigeria was 
overwhelmingly dependent on foreign exchange earnings from that mineral 
and did not have enough reserves to sustain an interruption for more than a 
few weeks. Oil payments were also the central government’s largest source 
124 See Memorandum of Conversation: Participation and Saudi-U.S. Oil Relations, September 
29, 1972, in NARA, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET SAUD, Confidential. 
125 See R.C. THORNTON, The Nixon Kissinger Years: The Reshaping of American Foreign 
Policy, Paragon House, New York, NY, 1989, p. 144.     
126 Agreement had been reached on June 18 in Iran, providing considerable future investments 
to increase production capacity, Iranian control of the Abadan refinery and construction by the 
Consortium of a new export refinery, with allocations to the Iranians of low-cost oil in order to 
allow them to develop their own exports. Telegram No. 165 from FCO to Certain Missions, 
June 23, 1972, Immediate, Confidential, Cypher CAT A and by Bag, 231520Z, in TNA, FCO 
65/1228, Production of Oil in Nigeria, JWN 12/1, Part C 100-151, 1972.    
127 See H. Smedley to J.W. McMeekin: Oil and Trade in Nigeria, Sept 8, 1972, Confidential, in 
TNA, FCO 65/1228, JWN 12/1, Part C 100-151, 1972. 
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of revenue and the basis for its financial dominance over the rest of the 
federation. That is why the Department of State thought that as long as 
technocrats decided Nigeria’s oil policies, it was very unlikely for them to 
stop oil flow.128
    On October 5, 1972, an agreement was reached on the question of 
participation with Persian Gulf members of OPEC, except Iran. An initial 
share of 25 percent was decided, starting from the following year and valid 
until 1977. Such a share was to be augmented by 5 percent each year, so 
that by 1982 producing governments were supposed to de facto nationalise 
the oil industry, with a 51 percent participation share. Moreover, producers 
had to receive a certain amount of crude to market as they wished.
  
129 The 
agreements were signed on December 20 by Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, 
while Kuwait and Qatar underwrote a similar document the following 
month. At the same time, United Nations debates seemed to favour 
countries rich of raw materials, since the General Assembly Resolution 
3016, though reminding that natural resources could be regarded not only 
as a question of domestic interests and were also to be used as a way to 
safeguard world peace, also stated that measures taken against countries 
claiming their sovereign rights on natural resources were a violation of the 
United Nations Chart.130 As concerned Nigeria, the FMG had all the 
interest in holding the attention of big powers and keeping resources 
flowing while minimising foreign leverage. Trade with the United States 
and the EEC was also a way to dilute bilateral relations with the United 
Kingdom, without tying itself into any association agreement with any 
other foreign power.131
                                                 
128 See Research Study, Bureau of Intelligence and Research: Nigeria – Oil Policy and 
Bargaining Power, 16 Oct 1972, Confidential, Controlled Dissem, in TNA, FCO 65/1229, 
Production of Oil in Nigeria, JWN 12/1, Part D 152-, 1972. 
 As we can see, while on political issues the two 
Atlantic allies shared common interests, especially as concerned Nigerian 
129 Cfr. V.X. HÂN, Oil, the Persian Gulf States, and the United States, Westport, CT-London, 
Praeger, 1994, pp. 100-101. 
130 See J.J. PAUST – A.P. BLAUSTEIN, The Arab Oil Weapon: A Threat to International Peace, 
in «The American Journal of International Law», LXVIII, 3, July 1974, p. 420. 
131 See African Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation Paper (PARA): Nigeria, 1972, 
Approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa, AF/W 77D84, 1788 POL 1-B 
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influence on their Southern African policies,132
 
 in terms of trade they were 
giving birth to a commercial competition.  
5. The Participation Agreements 
 
At the dawn of the second Nixon Administration, although U.S. 
investments in sub-Saharan Africa still constituted only 3 percent of the 
worldwide total and the region supplied only a small fraction of the world’s 
petroleum, what could not be ignored was the bright outlook which seemed 
to characterise that part of the planet, for many countries offered promise of 
untapped reserves and the volume of American investments was growing 
due to exploitation of natural resources. Moreover, while on one hand 
nationalism made economic negotiations rather tough, on the other hand it 
was unlikely for China and the USSR to enjoy dominating influence over 
the region and therefore to control its resources. Moreover, black Africa 
had 35 out of 132 votes at the United Nations Assembly.133
                                                 
132 American policies towards Southern Africa followed what decided through National 
Security Study Memorandum 39, issued in December 1969. In a few words, the United States 
did not have a great interest in solving racial problems and colonial conflicts in that part of the 
world. As concerned national liberation movements, Kissinger was persuaded that that they 
were all communist puppets and that should they manage to overthrow colonial regimes, they 
would pursue anti-West policies. The President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs 
wanted to avoid an open conflict in the area as long as Washington was still involved in the 
Vietnam War. According to the document, it was impossible to defeat the white regimes of the 
region through an armed struggle, therefore it was necessary to communicate with South Africa 
and the other white governments of the area. Such a policy provided also secret arms supplies 
to South Africa and Portugal. See M. EL-KHAWAS-B. COHEN, eds., The Kissinger Study of 
Southern Africa: Security Study Memorandum 39 (Secret), Westport, CT,  Lawrence Hil & 
Company, 1976, pp. 26-28. 
 If we consider 
that the American oil consultant, Walter Levy, affirmed that the Western 
world was by then facing a major oil supply crisis and that for the following 
five or ten years there was no way to reduce energy dependence on the 
Middle East, amounting to 30-40 percent of America’s oil imports and 70-
80 percent of those of Europe and Japan, it is easy to realise what Nigerian 
133 See Memorandum from F. Rondon of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s 
Assistant for National Security Affaire (Kissinger): Africa South of the Sahara – 
Recommendations for Action, Jan 2, 1973, Secret, GDS, in E.C. KEEFER (gen. ed.), P. SAMSON 
– L. VAN HOOK (eds.), FRUS 1969-1976, VOL. E-6, Documents on Africa, 1973-1976, doc. 1, 
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natural resources meant for the energy-thirsty West.134 American oil experts 
had realised that prices would inevitably rise, but nobody was able to 
understand that an era was completely over and that in a few months’ time 
such a raw material would be used as a diplomatic weapon and prices 
would rocket. Britain was also in a weak position in relation to great oil 
producers as long as North Sea oil fields were not active,135 that is why 
alternative energy sources, including coal and nuclear reactors, had to be 
developed.136 Unfortunately for the Western powers, both oil companies 
and the consuming countries’ governments had too little bargaining power 
and were thus subjected to blackmail by producers.137 Aware of this 
powerful stand, Nigeria started to give priority to strengthening ties with 
fellow-Africans and cooperating with other Third World countries, while 
relations with industrialised countries were regarded as less urgent. In 
particular, faced with U.S. pressures on issues they considered of low 
priority, the Nigerians were starting to distrust Washington. From this point 
of view, the growth of American investments and trade in Nigeria and the 
West African country’s expanding influence in the black continent was 
becoming a source of difficulties for U.S.-Nigerian relations, since 
sometimes the two nations’ interests collided.138
    The years up to the end of the decade were considered as decisive by 
British oil experts, for by that date it was estimated that Japan would 
depend on the Middle East for more than 95 percent of its oil, the EEC for 
86 percent, the United States for 50 percent and Britain for 25 percent. 
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Once a virtual monopoly was established, everyone was concerned about 
prices, since such a situation would enable Middle Eastern producers to 
push prices far higher than they already were. Moreover, it was thought that 
the burden on the balance of payments of Western countries would add 
something like twenty-five billion dollars to the reserves of Middle Eastern 
producers. Such a wealth could give them the financial strength to restrict 
or even interrupt supplies if they had the right commercial or political 
reasons.139 However, not even the Chief Executive of Royal Dutch Shell, 
G.A. Wagner, believed that the Arabs would interrupt oil flow for political 
reasons. Instead, he thought they would only use their power to toughly 
bargain on prices and maybe put pressure on a favourable settlement of the 
Arab-Israeli dispute. But a complete cut-off of supplies was out of 
question.140 Just to show how unaware of the reality even the Department 
of State was, both on the political use of oil and on the imminent 
astronomic price increase, suffice it to quote the Secretary of State’s own 
words. On June 11, 1973, in Tehran, he said that «all the talks about the 
Arabs using their oil as a political weapon was nonsense so far as the US 
was concerned». To this he added that «[…] the US would be perfectly 
prepared to apply the necessary conservation measures […] if the Arabs 
showed unwillingness to sell them the oil at bearable prices».141 While 
Rogers was speaking so optimistically, the Nigerian government signed a 
35 percent oil participation agreement with Shell-BP, with the right to 
increase ownership to 51 percent by 1982.142
                                                 
139 See Minute from Greenhill to Acland: Energy Policy, Apr 26, 1973, Confidential, SMG 
12/598/4, in DBPO, Series III, Vol. IV, doc. 76. 
 The volatility of the market 
was so high that there was by then spot demand for Nigerian crude at prices 
equal or even in excess of the posted price. This favourable trend made 
Nigeria able to be tougher and tougher in negotiations. Less than two 
140 See Note for the Record, June 5, 1973, Confidential, in TNA, PREM 15/1836, Part 2, 1972 
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months after the agreement with the British, in fact, the FMG started 
negotiations with Gulf and Mobil on a 40 percent participation.143
    Major oil exporters saw their opportunities in the possession of key 
energy sources and wanted to make the most of it. From their point of view, 
availability of adequate supplies to the consumers had to be related to: a) 
equating the price of oil to that of food and finished goods required by the 
exporters’ economies; b) acquiring surplus funds for accelerated 
development at home and investment abroad. Therefore, they were not 
satisfied with top prices for their oil, for they needed technology, know-
how, markets and co-operation that only industrialised consumers could 
provide. All this was linked to the feeling that is was just for them to expect 
so much from those who had exploited their weakness in the past. As 
concerned the United States, Washington lacked two of its major strengths 
of the past, that is self-sufficient domestic oil production and a relatively 
un-challenged international economic position.
      
144 As soon as Kissinger 
took office as Secretary of State, he began to study the U.S. posture in 
Africa. The situation was also more serious as even the most moderate and 
pro-West nations seemed to link their policies to pan-African and Third 
World issues. This was leading to intensified competition among Western 
nations, while Nigeria had by then replaced Venezuela as America’s second 
largest supplier of crude oil.145 The worst possible scenario took place after 
the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, when on October 17 Arab producers 
decided a reduction of crude production by 5 percent each month until the 
Israeli forces did not withdraw from all the territories occupied in 1967. 
The OPEC communiqué, however, also stated that the States supporting the 
Arab cause would not be hit by the embargo.146
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which was obviously temporary, what could really jeopardise the economy 
of the West was the price increase, first to 5.12 dollars a barrel in October 
and then up to 11.65 dollars in January. 
     For the first time, oil prices had been imposed by the producers without 
any negotiation and after the end of the war, with the oil embargo still on, 
the Joint Intelligence Committee of the British Cabinet wrote a report 
reminding that the Arabs would not forget the power recently acquired and 
that they would be tempted again to use the oil weapon in support of further 
demands against Israel or to back Third World causes. The paradox was 
that moderate pro-West regimes like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were 
showing themselves rather extremist on oil policies, while a radical State 
like Iraq, with more links with the USSR, was the only Arab country not to 
apply restrictions. On the other hand, London’s experts believed that it was 
not in the Arabs’ interest to hurt Europe so much. After all, the downward 
spiral they had set in motion could be counter-productive and a more 
unstable world would favour the Soviet Union, on which they did not want 
to depend. As concerned the Americans, the British Intelligence was 
persuaded that they did not have much leverage to have the ban lifted. In 
case of use of force against a single Arab country, then, a total embargo 
against the West was inevitable and the Arabs would also put pressure on 
other producers, notably Iran and Nigeria, to follow suit. This was exactly 
what Britain wanted to avoid. The point was that the Arab embargo had by 
then set a precedent and African producers were likely willing to use the oil 
weapon as a way to secure a victory in the struggle against white regimes in 
Southern African and other Third World issues.147 In an international 
conjuncture like that, it was easy to expect a scramble among consumers for 
the access to oil supplies. The Americans, for example, had already made 
bids for Nigerian oil equivalent to Nigeria’s total production, while the 
Japanese had made bids at very high prices for all the oil available at 
Iranian auctions.148
                                                 
147 See Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee: The Main Effects of the Middle East War, 
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 In a few words, with the Arab diplomatic and financial 
offensive, Nigeria had become one of the most important energy exporters 
in the world. As already said, its low-sulphur oil and its location quite close 
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policies and the armed struggle against white regimes in Southern Africa 
implied that it had become urgent to accommodate racial tensions and seek 
the mediation of a government like that of Gowon, who after all had always 
shown moderation in international matters.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Oil prices at the beginning of 1974 had become so high that the world oil 
bill was going to double. Kissinger himself was concerned about the 
negative impact not only on the U.S. balance of payments, but above on 
European economies.149 Once again, the international conjuncture had 
favoured Nigeria, which had been freed by higher prices from the necessity 
to exploit to the maximum its oil resources. Despite this, for 1975 the 
country was expected to receive eight billion dollars only for oil revenues. 
On grounds of this, the Department of State affirmed that this was the 
propitious time to develop co-operation with Lagos, which had invited the 
expansion of U.S. investments in all economic sectors. On the political side, 
the FMG was committed to the African struggle for self-determination and 
to economic efforts for the development of the Third World. From this 
point of view, the United States was often seen as being in opposition to 
these policies.150
    The American policy towards black Africa radically changed after the 
military coup overthrowing the dictatorship in Portugal, on April 25, 1974. 
The new government started negotiations with revolutionary forces in the 
colonies and already in August Mozambique became independent. NSSM 
39 was by then superseded, since Portugal’s domestic instability and the 
growing influence of the Communist Party could persuade Moscow that it 
was possible to begin a revolutionary phase in Africa.
   
151
                                                 
149 See FCO Telegram No. 2539 to Washington, Dec 31, 1973, SMG 12/304/3, 311740Z, 
Immediate, Confidential, GRS 200A, in DBPO, Series III, Vol. IV, doc. 486. 
 Such a situation 
could only determine a radical shift in Washington’s policies and once the 
whole structure of the Nixon Administration’s African policy had 
collapsed, Kissinger could no longer think that the problems of the area 
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could be solved without foreign mediation. Soviet, Cuban and Chinese aid 
to national liberation movements of Southern Africa made Kissinger 
believe that it had become necessary to contain communist influence in 
order to avoid a large scale war to re-establish the status quo ante.152 
Economic reasons were equally important, since most raw materials 
exported from Africa towards America came from that part of the 
continent.153 American strategic interests had not changed, but now there 
was a different scenario. While a few years earlier the White House thought 
that the white regimes could safeguard American interests, now it was of 
paramount importance to lessen tensions and gradually grant indigenous 
claims. Within this context, it was exactly Nigeria that the United States 
had to deal with to pursue its objectives. The importance the African 
country had acquired could be realised from the fact that Kissinger himself 
asked his Nigerian homologue to mediate for an oil price reduction. The 
Secretary admitted that in the past prices were too low, but now they were 
too high and this was leading to a world inflation, with prices of other 
commodities rising as fast as those of oil. In a way, it was strange that 
Kissinger complained that Nigeria had not taken the lead among oil 
producers to avoid confrontation and try to reduce prices.154 By then, as the 
largest exporter of oil to the United States, Nigeria had gained considerable 
leverage on the superpower, but at the beginning of the Ford 
Administration the relations between the two countries were worsening 
again due to the U.S. abstention on five International Bank for Research 
and Development loans to Nigeria for agricultural programmes. Nigeria had 
been excluded from the loan because the Bank had decided that a country 
with so many foreign currency reserves – four billion dollars in 1974 – no 
longer needed international assistance, but these purely economic 
motivations were not enough to avoid Nigerian suspicion that the United 
States was pursuing a hostile policy.155
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important country in black Africa for the United States, supplying 20 
percent of American foreign crude with political reliability and with a 
Gross Domestic Product of eighteen billion dollars corresponding to two-
thirds of the rest of black Africa combined. As the world’s fifth largest oil 
exporter and with an estimated forty trillion cubic feet of natural gas, in 
case of growing American dependence on foreign energy sources access to 
Nigeria’s market was obviously pivotal for the United States. By then 
American private investments, mostly in oil, roughly equalled those in 
South Africa and it was the U.S. Administration which had to encourage 
more exports to the West African country, due to a trade deficit for the 
United States of more than two billion dollars in 1974.156
     On grounds of this, the new Ford Administration ordered a review of the 
U.S. African policy, according to which it emerged that Nigeria had 
become for Washington as important as South Africa. American economic 
interests in Sub-Saharan Africa were modest, but they were growing more 
rapidly than in other parts of the world and Gulf and Mobil were the two 
American largest investors in the continent, where Nigeria was the largest 
market, with a favourable trade balance of eight billion dollars and the 
world’s ninth population. A closer association with Lagos was desirable, 
but Nigeria’s non-alignment policy did not ease the situation, and that is 
why American attitude towards IBRD loans was essential.
  
157
                                                                                                       
with the US?, Jan 28, 1975, Secret/Nodis/GDS, in NARA, RG 59, Central Policy Files, 1975, 
P8 30114-1446.
 By virtue of 
this, in the mid 1970s the State Department’s position collided with that of 
the Treasury. On grounds of purely economic reflections, the latter was 
trying to end IBRD loans to a country which had increased foreign 
exchange reserves up to 5.7 billion dollars, while Kissinger thought in 
strategic terms towards a country which was very important for the U.S. 
overall African policy and for the relations with the developing world. 
Helping Nigeria, which after all was still a low income country with a lack 
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of technology for development projects, matched American interests, and it 
was important to help the country build a Western-oriented development 
programme. Moreover, Washington had to draw bilateral relations with 
non-Arab oil producers to assure maximum production from them in case 
of another embargo.158 From a poor country located within the British 
traditional sphere of influence, Nigeria had become a privileged trading 
partner for the United States, thus leading to a commercial rivalry among 
Western allies. By then American geo-strategic interests coincided with 
economic ones; therefore, Kissinger got interested in Nigerian policies 
because of their repercussions on Washington’s commitment in Southern 
Africa. In light of the new African policy after the revolution in Portugal, 
the White House could no longer afford to leave what had become one of 
the world’s major oil exporters to allies which often had clashing interests 
in terms of energy needs and also Middle Eastern different positions. As 
regarded Nigeria, as revenues from petroleum rose, so did the State’s 
reliance on those revenues, so much so that by 1974 82 percent of all 
government revenues came from that source. This dependence on oil made 
the economy vulnerable to price fluctuations. Gowon increased the size of 
civil service, granting good salaries to government employees and invested 
a lot of money in infrastructural projects. Basing the economy on petroleum 
led to neglecting other sectors, such as agriculture, thus Nigeria had to 
spend huge amounts of money on food imports. As more money entered the 
country, consumptions were encouraged,159
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 especially in urban areas, 
which consequently increased inflation, so much so that food prices 
ballooned by 273 percent between 1973 and 1981. Finally, the oil boom led 
to the development of a “rentier State” in Nigeria. Unlike other States, 
where government revenues are generated within the country itself through 
taxes, in a “rentier State” revenues come from abroad, and in the case of 
Nigeria from oil companies paying rents through licenses and royalties. 
Under such a system, corruption runs rampant, since the State needs no 
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confidence other than that of the companies, while the citizens’ opinion of 
the government becomes irrelevant. An executive like that, and that was the 
case of the Nigerian military dictatorship, does not rely on popularity, but 
only on coercion and the control of natural resources. In conclusion, during 
the Gowon era, which ended on July 29, 1975, through another coup, there 
was little oversight of how oil revenues were spent and the process of 
indigenisation did little to improve the country’s living standard. Instead, it 
created a small class of businessmen whose interests were aligned with 
those of foreign investors and politicians who were using a booming 
economy to enrich themselves at the expense of the majority of the 
population.160
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